Infection control in paediatric office settings

Infectious Diseases and Immunization Committee, Canadian Paediatric Society (CPS)

Paediatr Child Health 2008;13(5):408-19
Reference No. ID 08-03

Parent handout: Avoiding infection: What to do at the doctor’s office

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Contents

ABSTRACT
Transmission of infection in the paediatric office is of increas­ing concern. The present document discusses routes of trans­mission of infection and the principles of current infection control measures. Prevention includes appropriate office design and administrative policies, triage, routine practices for the care of all patients (eg, hand hygiene; use of gloves, masks, eye protection and gowns for specific procedures; adequate cleaning, disinfection and sterilization of surfaces and equip­ment including toys, and aseptic technique for invasive procedures), and additional precautions for specific infections. Personnel should be adequately immunized, and those infected should follow work-restriction policies.
Key Words: Ambulatory; Infection control; Infection trans­mission; Paediatric office

INTRODUCTION
Young children readily acquire and transmit infections. They frequently harbour infectious organisms and may shed pathogens, especially respiratory and gastrointestinal viruses, even if asymptomatic. In places where young chil­dren gather, close proximity of large numbers of infectious and susceptible hosts favours transmission. Behavioural characteristics such as incontinence or inadequate hygiene, frequent mouthing of hands and toys or other objects, drooling and direct contact among children during play facilitate the spread of infection.

Prevention of transmission of infection in the physician’s office is an important component of patient care and is of concern to health care providers, patients and parents. There is a large body of data on infections acquired by children admitted to hospital, and there are established infection con­trol protocols to reduce the risk of infection in hospital. However, the risk of acquiring infection in ambulatory care settings, and the efficacy and feasibility of infection control measures in these settings are unknown. Published recom­mendations specific to physicians’ offices are sparse, impre­cise in some areas and may be difficult to implement (1-6).

The present statement will discuss published recommen­dations and areas of controversy, and will provide sugges­tions and recommendations based on professional opinion. The statement is directed to physicians who care for children in general office practice. Specialty ambulatory care settings where invasive procedures, such as dialysis, parenteral therapy, endoscopy, or outpatient surgery or dentistry are rou­tinely performed, may require additional measures.

Balancing priorities
Infection control programs are designed to reduce the risk of transmission so that it is at an acceptable level. The conse­quences of transmission in terms of infection severity and out­come must be weighed against the consequences of preventive measures taken. Practices must be tailored to the level of care being provided and the patient population served (1).

Prevention of transmission of infection and maintaining a child-friendly office may be opposing goals. Physicians must decide whether the benefits of an office in which chil­dren are free to play with each other, share toys, and gener­ally have fun and practice their social skills, outweigh the risks of the infections that may be acquired there.

BACKGROUND

Transmission of infection in paediatric ambulatory care settings
Most reported infections acquired in ambulatory care have been the result of procedures performed there – abscesses after injection of contaminated vaccines or medications, viral conjunctivitis from contaminated ophthalmic equipment, transmission of blood-borne viruses from inade­quately sterilized equipment, infections complicating out­patient surgery, and infections related to inadequate decontamination of endoscopes (7,8). Hepatitis B and C viruses have been transmitted by contamination of multi-dose vials or due to the use of the same physical space to prepare, dismantle and dispose of injection equipment (9).

Measles has been transmitted in paediatricians’ offices. In the 1980s, a large proportion of all cases of measles in the United States were acquired in ambulatory care settings (7,8). Transmission by contaminated air alone was docu­mented in two paediatric office outbreaks (10,11). There are reports of transmission of tuberculosis from physicians to patients in paediatricians’ offices (12,13).

Transmission of infections common in the community, such as varicella, pertussis, and viral respiratory and gastrointestinal infections, almost certainly occur in physicians’ offices but has not been reported, perhaps because of the difficulty in distinguishing between office and community exposures. Young children have four to 10 respiratory infections and up to four episodes of gas­troenteritis per year (14,15). They may acquire infection in day care, school, crowded shopping malls or recreational centres, or from siblings, parents, other family contacts, friends or caregivers. Only one published study has assessed risk of infection after a visit to a paediatric office. Rates of respiratory and gastrointestinal infections in healthy chil­dren younger than three years of age who had visited the office over the preceding week were compared with infec­tion rates in control children from the same paediatric prac­tice who had not visited the office over the preceding week. There was no increased risk of infection; 30% of those who had visited the office and 32% of those who had not visited, developed an infection (16). A pilot study (17) at the Montreal Children’s Hospital (Montreal, Quebec) did not find a significant difference in rates of new infections between children who had visited the emergency room over the previous week (17.5%) and those who had not (22.1%).

Factors influencing the risk of transmission
Young children and others who are unable to appropriately handle their respiratory secretions, children with diarrhea who are in diapers or incontinent, and those with infected open wounds or skin lesions are likely to be sources of infection (18).

Organisms that can survive on patient care equipment, environmental surfaces or toys are likely to be passed between patients. Heavy environmental contamination enhances transmission potential, as does a low infective dose. Respiratory viruses and rotavirus have low infective doses and persist for prolonged periods on inanimate objects (19-24). Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) (25) and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) (26) survive on stethoscope diaphragms. Transmission of RSV from the inanimate environment has been demonstrated (27). Contaminated electronic thermometer bases and blood pressure cuffs have been implicated in the transmis­sion of Clostridium difficile and vancomycin-resistant entero­coccus (VRE) (28-30).

Children who lack immunity to the infecting agent and those who are ill, debilitated or immunocompromised are at increased risk for disease.

The risk of transmission between patients may be less in an office than on a hospital ward. In offices, the duration of contact between individuals is shorter, patients are generally in better health and fewer invasive procedures are performed. However, patients may remain in crowded common waiting areas for prolonged periods of time; it may not be immediately recognized that a patient has a contagious illness and the need for short turnaround time for examination rooms may ham­per cleaning (4). Some practices have chosen to eliminate waiting rooms and place patients directly into examination rooms on arrival (31).

Principles of current infection control guidelines
The current guidelines for the prevention of transmission of infection are based on the following principles:

TABLE 1 Illnesses warranting Additional Precautions*


Infection  

Precautions

Duration of precautions


Antibiotic-resistant organisms (infection or colonization)

 

Contact

If patients assessed as at risk to transmit (see text)

Avian influenza†

 

Droplet plus Contact

To 14 days from onset

Enteroviral infection (diagnosed or
suspected)

 

Contact

Duration of illness

Gastroenteritis

 

Contact

Duration of symptoms or until infectious cause ruled out

Hepatitis, viral (types A and E, diagnosed or suspected)

 

Contact

Until viral infection ruled out; to 7 days after onset if hepatitis A

Influenza Droplet plus Contact Duration of illness

 

Measles (diagnosed or suspected)

 

Airborne

To 4 days after onset of rash (duration of illness if immunocompromised)

Measles contact, nonimmune, in incubation period

 

Airborne

From 5 days after the first day of exposure to 21 days after the last day of exposure

Meningitis (diagnosed or suspected

 

Droplet plus Contact

 

     Bacterial

 

Droplet

Until 24 h of appropriate antibiotic received

     Viral

 

Contact

Duration of illness

Mumps

 

Droplet

To 9 days after onset of swelling

Mumps contact, nonimmune, in incubation period

 

Droplet

From 10 days after the first day of exposure to 26 days after the last day of exposure

Pertussis (diagnosed or suspected)

 

Droplet

Until 5 days of appropriate antibiotic received or pertussis ruled out

Petechial or ecchymotic rash with fever (suspected meningococcemia)

 

Droplet

Until 24 h of appropriate antibiotic received or meningococcus ruled out

Rubella

 

Droplet

To 7 days after onset of rash

Rubella contact, nonimmune, in incubation period

 

Droplet

From 7 days after the first day of exposure to 21 days after last day of exposure

SARS†

 

Droplet plus Contact

10 days after resolution of fever

 

 

plus N95 masks

 

Scabies (diagnosed or suspected)

 

Contact

Until initial therapy applied

Skin infection (extensive lesions, abscess or infected wound if drainage or exudate not covered or contained by dressing)

 

Contact

Duration of drainage or until lesions healed

Streptococcus group A impetigo not covered by dressing

 

Contact

Until 24 h of appropriate therapy received

Streptococcus group A invasive disease, pharyngitis, pneumonia, scarlet fever

 

Droplet

Until 24 h of appropriate antibiotic received

Tuberculosis (diagnosed or suspected) infectious form‡

 

Airborne

Until assessed as not infectious

Varicella (diagnosed or suspected)

 

Airborne plus Contact

Until lesions crusted or varicella ruled out

Varicella contact, nonimmune, in incubation period

 

Airborne

From 8 days after the first day of exposure to 21 days after the last day of exposure; to 28 days if given varicella zoster immune globulin

Viral respiratory tract infection (diagnosed or suspected – bronchiolitis, cold, croup, pneumonia, pharyngitis)

 

Droplet plus Contact

Duration of illness or until viral infection ruled out

Zoster (diagnosed or suspected) – not covered   Airborne and Contact Until lesions crusted or zoster ruled out

*This list is not exhaustive. For infections not listed here, see tables in references 1 and 4; †These recommendations may be revised as more information becomes available. Local, provincial or federal authorities should be consulted; ‡Tuberculosis should be considered to be contagious in those with untreated cavitary pulmonary disease, laryngeal disease, smear-positive sputum, extensive lung involvement or disseminated congenital infection. Young children with tuberculosis are rarely infectious, but adult family members may be and should be assessed for cough. SARS Severe acute respiratory syndrome. Data from references 1,4,38,55-57

Routes of transmission of infection (1,2,4,18)
Contact transmission is the most frequent route and includes direct contact (physical contact between infected and susceptible patients) and indirect contact (via contami­nated intermediate surfaces such as hands, equipment and toys). Appropriate routine patient care practices should prevent most transmission by this route. Additional Contact Precautions (wearing gloves and gowns, and disinfection of equipment and surfaces) are warranted for infectious agents of low infective doses (eg, rotavirus) and for situations in which extensive contamination of the patient’s environ­ment is expected (eg, watery diarrhea which cannot be con­tained within a diaper, or a young child with respiratory infection and copious respiratory tract secretions).

Droplet transmission refers to transmission by large droplets that are expelled from the respiratory tract during coughing and sneezing, and inhaled by or deposited onto the respiratory mucous membranes of persons close to the infected child. Special ventilation is not required because the large droplets do not stay suspended in the air, but settle on surfaces close to the source patient. Surgical or procedure masks are recom­mended for those within 2 m of the patient (prior guidelines stated 1 m). Some organisms transmitted by this route (eg, Haemophilus influenzae type b, Neisseria meningitidis and Bordetella pertussis) are very fragile and do not survive in the environment or on hands.

Other organisms such as RSV, influenza, parainfluenza, rhinovirus, adenovirus and SARS coronavirus survive long enough on surfaces to be picked up on hands of patients or personnel. For these, droplet and contact transmission occurs. Thus, respiratory viruses may be transmitted by inhalation, by deposition of large droplets onto mucous membranes or by inoculation of nasal mucosa or conjunctiva by contaminated hands. Surgical or procedure masks protect personnel from acquisition by deposition of droplets, and may also help to keep the hands away from the nose and mouth. Eye shields give added protection against infection via the conjunctiva. Face shields or goggles have been shown to prevent RSV infection in health care personnel (34,35). RSV transmission to personnel was also reduced by the use of gloves in the absence of masks and eye protection, probably because per­sonnel were less likely to touch their noses or eyes with gloved hands, suggesting that for RSV, contact transmission may be more important than droplet transmission (36,37).

Airborne transmission occurs when infectious particles survive in aerosols of small desiccated droplets from the respiratory tract or from skin squames which remain suspended in the air and are dispersed over large distances by air currents. Control requires a negative-pressure room with air exhausted outside the building or passed through a high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter before recircula­tion. Special tight-fitting masks with built in filters that remove particles down to 1 µ diameter at a 95% efficacy (N95) are recommended for susceptible persons who must enter the room. Airborne transmission is uncommon but important because varicella, measles, tuberculosis and smallpox are spread by this route. Although evidence sug­gests that SARS coronavirus is transmitted by large droplet and contact spread, it is thought that small particle aerosols may be generated during certain procedures such as intuba­tion or bronchoscopy (4,38).

N95 masks are rarely needed in paediatricians’ offices. Personnel should be immune to varicella and measles; tuberculosis in children is rarely contagious (2). Tuberculosis should be considered contagious in those with untreated cavitary pulmonary disease, laryngeal disease, smear-positive sputum, extensive lung involvement or dis­seminated congenital infection (39). In the event of an out­break of a new pathogen such as SARS, or a re-emergence of smallpox, N95 masks may be indicated.

The inanimate environment and infection
Prevention of acquisition of infection from the inanimate environment involves appropriate disinfection and sterili­zation of equipment and other items, cleaning of surfaces and maintenance of ventilation and plumbing.

For purposes of processing, medical equipment is classi­fied into three groups. Items that are introduced into sterile body spaces (critical) must be sterile. Items in contact with mucous membranes or nonintact skin or through which inspired air flows (semicritical) require high-level disinfec­tion designed to inactivate all microorganisms except bac­terial spores. Items that are only in contact with intact skin (noncritical) require low-level disinfection designed to remove most microrganisms and bring contamination to an acceptable level (2-5,40,41).

Most examination equipment in an office setting is in con­tact with only the intact skin of the patient. Some experts have suggested that cleaning with detergent and water is suf­ficient for noncritical equipment (6,40,42). A disinfectant should be used if the equipment is contaminated with blood or body fluid. Ideally, all such equipment should be cleaned between patients (1,2,6). If this is not feasible, daily cleaning may suffice, but equipment must be cleaned before reuse if it is contaminated with patient secretions or excretions or if vis­ibly soiled (1-3). Equipment that does not have direct patient contact should be cleaned on a routine basis and if soiled.
Environmental surfaces should be cleaned on a routine basis, with a low-level disinfectant or detergent (2,3,5,40,41). Frequently touched surfaces should be cleaned daily (2,3). Cleaning with detergent and water may suffice, unless surfaces are contaminated with blood or body fluids (2,40,41) (Table 2).

TABLE 2 Sterilization and disinfection requirements


Instrument

 

Level of disinfection

 

Products


Critical items – items that enter sterile tissue (eg, needles)

 

Sterilization

 

Steam, dry heat, chemical sterilants

Semicritical items – items that contact mucous membranes or nonintact skin but do not enter  tissue (eg, laryngoscopes, specula)

 

Sterilization or high-level disinfection

 

Pasteurization, 2% glutaraldehyde, 0.55% orthophthalaldehyde, 6% to 7.5% hydrogen peroxide with or without peracetic acid, immersion in sodium hypochlorite 5.25% diluted 1:50 for ≥20 min, immersion in boiling water for 20 min

Noncritical items* – items that touch only intact skin (eg, stethoscopes or blood pressure cuffs)

 

Intermediate-or low-level disinfection
     Detergent and water
     considered sufficient by
     some authorities

 

70% to 90% ethyl or isopropyl alcohol, sodium hypochlorite 5.25% diluted 1:500, 3% hydrogen peroxide, quaternary ammonium products,  iodine, iodophors, 0.5% accelerated hydrogen peroxide, phenolics†

Environmental surfaces – doorknobs, table tops, carts, floors

 

Low-level disinfection or detergent and water

 

 


*If visibly contaminated with blood, use sodium hypochlorite diluted 1:10 to 1:100 or 70% to 90% alcohol; †Phenolics should not be used for items that will be in direct contact with the skin of newborns. Data from references 2,3,5,6,40,41,59

Toys and transmission of infection
Playing together and sharing of toys contribute to the child’s development of social skills. Toys may be considered as part of the equipment of a paediatrician’s office, but shar­ing of toys poses a potential health risk. Microbial contam­ination of toys has been documented in hospitals, physician’s offices and day care centres (43-45). Fecal coliforms and rotavirus have been found on toys in day care centres and in hospital (46,47).

In one study (48) in doctors’ offices, toys in waiting rooms were tested at least one week after the last cleaning. Coliforms were found on 90% of soft toys and 13.5% of hard toys. Hard toys that had been cleaned regularly every one to two weeks had lower counts than those from offices with no routine cleaning, while soft toys cleaned every one to two weeks had similar counts to those not cleaned. Hard toys were effectively decontaminated by cleaning and soak­ing for 1 h in a bleach solution. Soft toys washed in a wash­ing machine remained contaminated, but soaking in bleach for 30 min before washing was effective. By one week of use, soft toys were again contaminated with coliforms, whereas hard toys were not. The authors concluded that soft toys were unsuitable for doctors’ waiting rooms (48).

In the guidelines published in 2000 (42), the American Academy of Pediatrics recommended cleaning of toys in offices. In response to these recommendations, some paedia­tricians eliminated toys from their waiting rooms, finding the cleaning and monitoring of toy use too arduous (49). Physicians must consider the needs of children when weigh­ing the risks and benefits of having toys in their offices.

Toy manufacturers have incorporated antiseptics into plastic toys. There is no evidence that this practice has an impact on contamination of toys with microorganisms or on transmission of infection, nor is there any theoretical basis to support such effects (2,41).

Hand hygiene
Hand hygiene is a crucial element in infection control. Traditionally this has been performed with soap and water. Alcohol-based hand rinses and gels have been shown to be more effective than soap and water for removing micro­organisms from hands, and they also save time (1,2,50). Small containers which may be carried in the pocket or clipped to the clothing are readily available for use when needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS
In the absence of data from paediatric office settings, all recommendations are based on expert opinion and extrapo­lations from other health care settings, with level of evi­dence rating of B-III (51).

Administrative policies

Office design Triage
Triage should be performed by telephone at the time the appointment is made or as soon as possible after arrival (2-6).

Waiting rooms

Routine Practices for care of all patients
Hand hygiene

Personal protective equipment Policies regarding blood-borne pathogens Disinfection, sterilization and cleaning of equipment and surfaces Cleaning of toys Aseptic technique and injection safety Respiratory Etiquette
Respiratory Etiquette refers to measures designed to mini­mize the transmission of respiratory pathogens via the droplet route in health care settings, using source contain­ment beginning at the point of initial patient encounter (2,4,5,54). These measures include:

Additional Precautions (Table 1)
Airborne Transmission Precautions

Droplet Transmission Precautions Contact Precautions AROs in ambulatory care TABLE 3 Work restrictions for health care providers

Infection

 

Restriction

 

Duration


Blood-borne viruses: (Hepatitis B and C, HIV)

 

From performing specific exposure-prone procedures at high risk of transfer of blood (59)

 

As per local public health policy (viremia resolved or blood viral load controlled)

Colds, other viral upper respiratory tract infections

 

From direct care of high-risk patients*. For other patients, wear surgical or procedure mask during care and perform hand hygiene after any contact with nasal or respiratory secretions and before any patient contact

 

Until symptoms resolved

Conjunctivitis

 

From direct patient care

 

Until exudate resolved

Gastroenteritis†

 

From direct patient care

 

Until symptoms resolved or illness deemed noncontagious

Hepatitis A

 

From direct patient care

 

Until one week after onset of jaundice

Herpes simplex, orofacial

 

From direct care of newborns and nonimmune immunocompromised patients if lesions not covered‡

 

Until lesions dry

Herpetic whitlow

 

From direct patient care

 

Until lesions dry

Influenza

 

From office

 

Until symptoms resolved

Measles

 

From office

 

Until four days after onset of rash

Mumps

 

From office

 

Until nine days after onset of parotitis

Pediculosis

 

From direct patient care

 

Until one treatment completed (<24 h)

Pertussis

 

From office

 

Until five days of appropriate antibiotic

Rubella

 

From office

 

Seven days after onset of rash

Scabies

 

From direct patient care

 

Until one treatment completed (<24 h)

Staphylococcal skin infection (MSSA)

 

From direct patient care if

 

Until lesions on hands are healed



       Lesions on hands  

Until lesions elsewhere can be covered by dressings

 

       Lesions elsewhere with exudates or
     drainage that cannot be effectively
     contained by dressing

 

 

Staphylococcal skin infection (MRSA)

 

From direct patient care

 

Until lesions healed and assessed for risk of transmission

Streptococcus group A
infection

 

From direct patient care

 

Until treated for 24 h

Tuberculosis, active pulmonary

 

From office

 

Until assessed as noninfectious

Varicella From office Until lesions crusted

Zoster

 

From direct patient care if not covered. If covered:

 

Until lesions crusted

 

       From care of newborns and nonimmune
     immunocompromised patients and
     pregnant women
 

 


* Patients with hemodynamically significant congenital heart disease or chronic lung disease, neonates and immunocompromised patients; †Clinically significant diarrhea or vomiting; ‡If working, keep lesions covered, avoid touching face during patient care, wear surgical or procedure mask during care and wash hands after touching lesions and before touching any patient or patient care equipment. MRSA Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; MSSA Methicillin-susceptible S aureus. Data from references 2,5,6,52

Health of personnel

Medical waste

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The College of Family Physicians of Canada and the Canadian Paediatric Society’s Community Paediatrics Committee reviewed this position statement.

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INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND IMMUNIZATION COMMITTEE
Members: Drs Robert Bortolussi, IWK Health Centre, Halifax, Nova Scotia (chair); Dorothy L Moore, The Montreal Children’s Hospital, McGill University Health Centre, Montreal, Quebec; Joan L Robinson, Edmonton, Alberta; Élisabeth Rousseau-Harsany, Sainte-Justine UHC, Montreal, Quebec (board representative); Lindy M Samson, Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario, Ottawa, Ontario
Consultant: Dr Noni E MacDonald, IWK Health Centre, Halifax, Nova Scotia
Liaisons: Drs Upton D Allen, The Hospital for Sick Children, Toronto, Ontario (Canadian Pediatric AIDS Research Group); Scott A Halperin, IWK Health Centre, Halifax, Nova Scotia (Immunization Program, ACTive); Charles PS Hui, Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario, Ottawa, Ontario (Health Canada, Committee to Advise on Tropical Medicine and Travel); Larry Pickering, Elk Grove, Illinois, USA (American Academy of Pediatrics, Red Book Editor and ex-officio member of the Committee on Infectious Diseases); Marina I Salvadori, Children’s Hospital of Western Ontario, Ottawa, Ontario (CPS Representative to the National Advisory Committee on Immunization)
Principal author: Dr Dorothy L Moore, The Montreal Children’s Hospital, Montreal, Quebec

Last revised: May 2009


Disclaimer: The recommendations in this position statement do not indicate an exclusive course of treatment or procedure to be followed. Variations, taking into account individual circumstances, may be appropriate. Internet addresses are current at time of publication.